Tuesday, February 08, 2005
Fukuyama and the End of History revisited
Francis Fukuyama presented a worthy follow-up to his now famous "end of history" thesis earlier today, one which was worthy of both the praise and controversy of the original. More importantly, it reinforced the relevance of Fukuyama's thesis in our current global political situation. (The original article can be read here) Needless to say, Fukuyama did not disappoint, restating the thrust of his monumental thesis, and adapting to objections that the last decade and a half have raised. Chiefly among these, he discussed the rise of Radical Islamo-fascism, and the recent Euro-American schism.For those unfamiliar, Fukuyama proposed on February 8th, 1989 (in the same room, Social Sciences 122, no less) and later in an article in the National Interest and a book of the same name, that the end of the cold war marked a resounding victory for western democracy and culture. He argued that the progression of modernization had its goal not in socialism, but in liberal democracy. He writes that it marked:
His discussion this evening focused mainly on the topics of dissent mentioned earlier. He notes that there is empirically a de facto Muslim exception to the progress of modernization. This discussion seems particularly relevant to me, as opponents of Bush's "democracy on the march" seem to imply that Arab-Muslims are inherently unfit for democratic society. Fukuyama argued to the opposite, noting first that non-Arab Islamic nations, such as Turkey and Indonesia, have not experienced the same lag in political or economic modernization. Thus the problem must be one not of Islamic origins, but of cultural Arab roots. This seems to skirt the issue, at least slightly, in my opinion, but he led in nicely to the topic of Radical Islam. He argued that it is not in fact a fundamentalist movement at all, instead a reactionary movement taking place in Arab-Islamic countries that borrows from the extreme right and left of 20th century Europe. He compared its sudden rise to that of German Fascism; a people in need of an identity in the midst of industrialization. He then argued, and I tend to agree, that were it not for the support of oil rich Saudi Arabia and Yemen, such a movement would be a much smaller phenomenon. He stated that he this does not render outdated his thesis, on the grounds that Islamic theocracy and Islamo-Fascism are rejected by the mainstream Arab world.
On the second issue of division, he proposed that certain cultural differences between the US and Europe lead to the current divisions, but will not result in an "civilizationary" change. Among them, he cited Europeans love of the welfare state, differing views on sovereignty, and beliefs on the use of military. He concluded by noting that he has no answer to those not at the end of history, because there is no accepted theory as to what drives and enables modernization. The force of Fukuyama's argument has lost little of its strength in 16 years (amusingly, both he and the professor who introduced him both cited today as the 15th anniversary, not the 16th), and less of its eloquence. His subtle adaptations lend credence to many of the claims made by present day conservatives regarding the spread of democracy and western values. I was most pleased with his comments on Muslims in Europe, an Issue Pete addressed in an earlier post. Europe, he said, must craft policies that both recognize that they are no longer a Christian society, and ask of their immigrants that they accept certain enlightenment ideals common to Europe and western civilization.
Criticism abounded during the questioning period, among them one man accusing Fukuyama of painting modernization as a "paradise on earth," while glossing over the remarkable atrocities of the last century, which are greatly attributed to modernization. This of course, is a common liberal objection to the thesis, and simply shows a lack of understanding of Fukuyama's true argument. As his thesis states, (and Roger Kimball argues nicely here ) the end of history does not imply an end to either conflict or development. Nor is he trying to paint modernization as a cultural panacea. Technology is morally nuetral, we must remember, and just because a particular development carries with it the capacity to do evil does not make that development inherently evil (see liberals on gun control). On the issue of Islamo-Fascism as a threat to liberal democracy, I tend ot think that the more powerful rebuttal is the one he largely skirted over. The fact that the movement is based on tenants of the Arab-Islamic World, and outdated political philosophy, means that it lacks any sort of broad appeal outside of the Arab world. It would need the broader appeal of the socialists worker's movement, for example, in order to be classified as a threat demanding he revise his thesis. As a final note of interest, at one point Fukuyama offered a stirring defense of American exceptionalism, scoffing at the suggestion that a "neo-con conspiracy" had given rise to it. He pointed out that on the back of the $1 bill can be seen a Masonic symbol, below which is the inscription "New Order of the Ages." Fukuyama seems to agree.
...the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government. This is not to say that there will no longer be events to fill the pages of Foreign Affair's yearly summaries of international relations, for the victory of liberalism has occurred primarily in the realm of ideas or consciousness and is as yet incomplete in the real or material world. But there are powerful reasons for believing that it is the ideal that will govern the material world in the long run.
His discussion this evening focused mainly on the topics of dissent mentioned earlier. He notes that there is empirically a de facto Muslim exception to the progress of modernization. This discussion seems particularly relevant to me, as opponents of Bush's "democracy on the march" seem to imply that Arab-Muslims are inherently unfit for democratic society. Fukuyama argued to the opposite, noting first that non-Arab Islamic nations, such as Turkey and Indonesia, have not experienced the same lag in political or economic modernization. Thus the problem must be one not of Islamic origins, but of cultural Arab roots. This seems to skirt the issue, at least slightly, in my opinion, but he led in nicely to the topic of Radical Islam. He argued that it is not in fact a fundamentalist movement at all, instead a reactionary movement taking place in Arab-Islamic countries that borrows from the extreme right and left of 20th century Europe. He compared its sudden rise to that of German Fascism; a people in need of an identity in the midst of industrialization. He then argued, and I tend to agree, that were it not for the support of oil rich Saudi Arabia and Yemen, such a movement would be a much smaller phenomenon. He stated that he this does not render outdated his thesis, on the grounds that Islamic theocracy and Islamo-Fascism are rejected by the mainstream Arab world.
On the second issue of division, he proposed that certain cultural differences between the US and Europe lead to the current divisions, but will not result in an "civilizationary" change. Among them, he cited Europeans love of the welfare state, differing views on sovereignty, and beliefs on the use of military. He concluded by noting that he has no answer to those not at the end of history, because there is no accepted theory as to what drives and enables modernization. The force of Fukuyama's argument has lost little of its strength in 16 years (amusingly, both he and the professor who introduced him both cited today as the 15th anniversary, not the 16th), and less of its eloquence. His subtle adaptations lend credence to many of the claims made by present day conservatives regarding the spread of democracy and western values. I was most pleased with his comments on Muslims in Europe, an Issue Pete addressed in an earlier post. Europe, he said, must craft policies that both recognize that they are no longer a Christian society, and ask of their immigrants that they accept certain enlightenment ideals common to Europe and western civilization.
Criticism abounded during the questioning period, among them one man accusing Fukuyama of painting modernization as a "paradise on earth," while glossing over the remarkable atrocities of the last century, which are greatly attributed to modernization. This of course, is a common liberal objection to the thesis, and simply shows a lack of understanding of Fukuyama's true argument. As his thesis states, (and Roger Kimball argues nicely here ) the end of history does not imply an end to either conflict or development. Nor is he trying to paint modernization as a cultural panacea. Technology is morally nuetral, we must remember, and just because a particular development carries with it the capacity to do evil does not make that development inherently evil (see liberals on gun control). On the issue of Islamo-Fascism as a threat to liberal democracy, I tend ot think that the more powerful rebuttal is the one he largely skirted over. The fact that the movement is based on tenants of the Arab-Islamic World, and outdated political philosophy, means that it lacks any sort of broad appeal outside of the Arab world. It would need the broader appeal of the socialists worker's movement, for example, in order to be classified as a threat demanding he revise his thesis. As a final note of interest, at one point Fukuyama offered a stirring defense of American exceptionalism, scoffing at the suggestion that a "neo-con conspiracy" had given rise to it. He pointed out that on the back of the $1 bill can be seen a Masonic symbol, below which is the inscription "New Order of the Ages." Fukuyama seems to agree.
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